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ABSTRACT
The paper presents the fiscal theory of the price level in a variety of models, including endowment
economies with lump-sum taxes and production economies with proportional income taxes. We offer
a microeconomic perspective on the fiscal theory by computing a Slutsky-Hicks decomposition of
the effects of tax changes into substitution, wealth, and revaluation effects. Revaluation effects arise
whenever tax changes alter the value of outstanding nominal government liabilities by changing the
price level. Under certain assumptions on monetary and fiscal behavior, the revaluation effect
reflects the fiscal theory mechanism. When taxes distort, two Laffer curves arise, implying that a tax
increase can lower or raise the price level and the revaluation effect can be positive or negative,
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1. Introduction
Occasionally a new idea in macroeconomics generates professional reactions that
are, in equal parts, excitement and vitriol. The ﬁscal theory of the price level is such
an idea. It is provocative because it attributes to ﬁscal policy a potentially important
role in determining the general level of prices in the economy, placing it in direct
competition with the venerable quantity theory of money. At the same time, the
ﬁscal theory constitutes a new channel for breaking Ricardian equivalence–one that
comes from the valuation of nominal government liabilities. Unlike existing methods
for deviating from Ricardian equivalence, which rely on market imperfections, myopic
consumers, or tax distortions, the ﬁscal theory arises from particular combinations of
monetary and ﬁscal policies.
The label “the ﬁscal theory of the price level” would seem to imply that ﬁscal pol-
icy alone determines the price level, and this is certainly the tone of several papers
on the topic. We regard the label to be a misnomer. In all theories of price level
determination–whether the ﬁscal theory or the quantity theory–the equilibrium
price level emerges from particular combinations of monetary and ﬁscal policy behav-
ior. In both theories it is impossible to even derive an equilibrium without completely
specifying both monetary and ﬁscal behavior. Where the theories part company is in
their predictions of how monetary or ﬁscal changes aﬀect the price level.
The ﬁscal theory lurks in any dynamic model with monetary and ﬁscal policies.
The theory’s linchpin is a ubiquitous dynamic equilibrium condition that equates the
real value of total nominal government liabilities–typically high-powered money plus
unindexed debt–to the expected discounted present value of net-of-interest surpluses
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plus seigniorage.
1 This condition stems from combining the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint with some private-sector optimality conditions. Critiques of
the ﬁscal theory spring, in large part, from interpretations of the role this condition
plays in determining equilibrium.
This paper tries to avoid the controversy surrounding the ﬁscal theory by describing
it in ways that do not get mired in interpretation of the contentious equilibrium
condition. Instead, the paper takes a more microeconomic approach to show how the
ﬁscal theory works in several conventional models. First, section 2 uses a permanent
income model to describe the ﬁscal theory mechanism in partial equilibrium terms.
In section 3 we present a textbook exposition of the theory using a simple general
equilibrium model with lump-sum taxes. Although patently unrealistic, lump-sum
taxes serve the useful purpose of isolating demand-side impacts of taxes. In this
environment, higher taxes unambiguously lower the price level by raising the expected
present value of surpluses. Section 4 presents some results from recent work on simple
monetary and tax policy rules, framing the backdrop for the ﬁscal theory.
Although instructive for some purposes, the assumption that all taxes are lump
sum prevents the ﬁscal theory from being understood in the context of the broader
public ﬁnance literature. Section 5 addresses this, ﬁrst by introducing income taxes
and elastic labor supply, and second by decomposing the total eﬀect of a tax change
into conventional substitution and wealth eﬀects plus an asset revaluation eﬀect. The
revaluation eﬀect arises when tax changes alter the equilibrium price level and, there-
fore, the real value of outstanding nominal government liabilities. This revaluation
eﬀect is always present in economies with nominal government liabilities. Under the
ﬁscal theory, where ﬁscal policy aﬀects the price level through the ubiquitous dynamic
equilibrium condition, the revaluation eﬀect is the ﬁrst step in the transmission of
ﬁscal disturbances. This leads to viewing the ﬁscal theory as operative whenever
certain monetary-ﬁscal policy combinations imply that the dynamic equilibrium con-
dition imposes restrictions on the equilibrium price-level process.
The paper extends examination of the ﬁscal theory of the price level to a model
with the simplest kind of tax distortion–a proportional labor income tax. Introducing
supply-side eﬀects of taxes produces a richer set of possible implications from the ﬁscal
theory. Tax hikes can lower or raise the price level, depending on whether they raise
1The notion that the ﬁscal theory of the price level can be the mechanism that determines the
general level of prices and inﬂation potentially applies to any economy where the government sells
debt denominated in its home currency. This encompasses a great many countries, including, for
example, most OECD countries. Countries that issue “real debt” (indexed to inﬂation or denom-
inated in foreign currency) are still susceptible to the mechanism that the ﬁscal theory highlights,
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or lower the expected present value of surpluses plus seigniorage. This intertemporal
link between tax rates and the government’s budget represents a new type of Laﬀer
curve that, under the ﬁscal theory, is central to determining the impacts of ﬁscal
changes on the economy.
Microeconomic public ﬁnance economists should care about the ﬁscal theory be-
cause it identiﬁes a new channel by which ﬁscal policies can aﬀect economic activity.
This channel is typically absent from both micro and macro models of taxation.
Whether the channel shows up entirely in inﬂation or in some split among inﬂation,
real interest rates, and output depends on details about how the economy works and
t h en a t u r eo ft h et a xc o d e . B u te v e ni ft h eﬁscal theory mechanism only generates
inﬂation, it can have important distributional impacts that aﬀect the incidence of
taxation. Accounting for these eﬀects may be important for designing tax systems.
Because the ﬁscal theory is an intrinsically general equilibrium phenomenon, any
discussion of the theory must explicitly account for monetary policy behavior. The
theory underscores that monetary and ﬁscal policies cannot coherently be understood
in isolation from each other. It also implies that the design of tax and monetary sys-
tems should be a joint endeavor. Although in practice monetary and ﬁscal systems
tend to be disjoint–witness the European Monetary System and the development
of monetary union–recent research on optimal policy recognizes the importance of
considering monetary and ﬁscal policies jointly [Benigno and Woodford (2003), Eg-
gertsson and Woodford (2004), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b)].
There is plenty of precedent for this topic that predates more recent, formal discus-
sion. Important work includes Friedman (1948, 1960), Brunner and Meltzer (1972,
1993), and Tobin (1961, 1969, 1980). Sargent and Wallace (1981) lay the founda-
tion for understanding monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions in dynamic economies.
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) is a relatively recent important contribution. What is
referred to as “the ﬁscal theory of the price level,” developed in Leeper (1991, 1993),
Sims (1994), and Woodford (1994, 1995), is now part of standard graduate macro cur-
ricula [Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Walsh (2003),
and Woodford (2003)].
2. A Permanent Income Exposition of the Fiscal Theory
The permanent income hypothesis of consumption, as Hall (1978) framed it, can
clearly explain the mechanism underlying the ﬁscal theory of the price level. The
household makes a consumption-saving decision. It receives a sequence of labor in-
comes, {yt}, pays taxes, {τt}, and saves in the form of nominal assets, {At+1}, which
consist of government debt and money, At = Mt−1+Bt−1. To simplify the exposition,
we assume that assets that pay one unit of consumption goods at t +1sell for 1/RPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 4
at t, where 1/R = β, the household’s discount factor. The household chooses the





t [u(ct)+v(Mt/Pt)], 0 <β<1, (1)
where u and v are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and diﬀerentiable functions,
Mt/Pt is real money balances, and E0 is the expectations operator conditional on















where i is the (net) nominal interest rate, so it/(1 + it) is the opportunity cost of
holding money.












mt+j − yt+j + τt+j
¸
, (3)
where mt = Mt/Pt is real money balances.2 Quadratic preferences make the optimal
choice of consumption follow a martingale
ct = Etct+1. (4)
Imposing (4) on (3) yields the consumption function
















which makes consumption a constant share of wealth. The ﬁr s tp a r to fw e a l t hi st h e
r e a lv a l u ea td a t et of nominal assets carried over from the previous period and the
second part is the expected discounted present value of income after expenditures on
taxes and money holdings.
Expression (5) is suggestive as a partial equilibrium description of consumption
behavior. It is not general equilibrium b e c a u s ew eh a v en o ti m p o s e dt h eo p t i m a l
choice of money, market clearing, or the government’s budget constraint. Nonetheless,
the consumption function makes clear that ceteris paribus a surprise transitory cut in
taxes at time t (lower τt) or an anticipated cut in future taxes (lower τt+j), increase
the demand for current consumption goods by raising wealth.
2Expression (3) has imposed that limT→∞ Et[R−T(AT+1/PT)] = 0.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 5
The general equilibrium impacts of such a tax reduction depend on details about
the model as well as assumptions about how current and expected monetary and
ﬁscal policies respond to the tax cut. To preview the simplest form of the ﬁscal
theory with lump-sum taxes, imagine an environment in which the central bank pegs
the nominal interest rate, the ﬁscal authority refuses to pay for tax reductions with
future tax hikes, and prices are ﬂexible. Under these assumptions, lower τt raises
the expected sum in (5), causing the demand for consumption goods at t to rise.
If supply of goods is perfectly inelastic, higher demand drives the aggregate price
level up to the point at which households are happy to consume their pre-tax level of
goods. Equilibrium is restored when the price level rises suﬃciently to reduce the real
value of nominal assets enough to exactly oﬀset the increase in after-tax labor income,
leaving no change in wealth. This simple analysis embodies the textbook description
of the ﬁscal theory: current or prospective changes in taxes are “ﬁnanced” through
jumps in the price level that revalue outstanding nominal government liabilities [see,
for example, Walsh (2003)]. But we cannot formally derive these results without a
complete general equilibrium model of the economy.
3. A Simple General Equilibrium Model
The simplest general equilibrium model for describing the relationship between
monetary and ﬁscal policies and inﬂation assumes an endowment economy with lump-
sum taxes. This simpliﬁcation occurs with important loss of generality, as section 5
shows.3
3.1. Setup. An inﬁnitely lived representative household is endowed with a constant




















where Mt is nominal money balances, Bt is a nominal bond that costs $1 at t and
pays 1+it dollars at t +1 ,a n dτt is lump-sum taxes (if positive) and transfers (if
negative).4 Initial assets M−1 + B−1 > 0 are given. We consider perfect foresight
3See also Leeper (2003) and Gordon and Leeper (forthcoming).
4The assumption in the preference speciﬁcation, (6), that private and government consumption
are perfect substitutes, is not essential. It allows us to couch the discussion in terms of the net-of-
interest ﬁscal surplus, τt − gt, instead of tax revenues. In this case, government purchases have thePOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 6
equilibria, so the Et operator denotes equilibrium expectations of private agents over
future policy; it distinguishes between current and past policies (dated t and earlier)
and future policies (dates s>t ).
The government chooses {Mt,B t,τt} to ﬁnance a constant level of purchases of





Bt − (1 + it−1)Bt−1
Pt
+ τt.( 8 )
3.2. Equilibrium. Arbitrage between the two nominal assets–money and bonds–
equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real money bal-







Market clearing implies that ct + gt = y, for all t, and money and bond markets
clear by equating the private sector’s demand for the assets to the policy authority’s









where 1/β is the constant real interest rate and πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt is the gross inﬂation
rate.
We focus on circumstances in which the economy is in a stationary equilibrium
at dates s>t , but starts from a diﬀerent equilibrium at t. This breaks time into
two periods: now and the future. Assume policies are ﬁxed in the future stationary
equilibrium:
τs = τ, µs = µ, s > t, (11)
where µt = Mt/Mt−1 is the growth rate of the money supply. At t, however, policies
may be diﬀerent:
τt 6= τ, µt 6= µ. (12)
In the stationary equilibrium with constant real money balances, inﬂation depends
only on money growth:
π = µ. (13)
same eﬀect on the economy as transfer payments; because in this section taxes are lump sum, τ and
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Combining this with the Fisher relation implies that in the stationary equilibrium
the nominal rate depends on money growth,
1+is = µ/β, s ≥ t, (14)
so from (9) stationary real balances is
Ms
Ps
= f(µ),s ≥ t. (15)
3.3. Equilibrium Expectations. We now derive two versions of the government
budget constraint that describe the trade-oﬀs among current and future monetary







(1 + (1 + it−1)Bt−1/Mt−1)
¸
= g − τt. (16)
For given policies in the (future) stationary equilibrium, (16) reports the feasible
trade-oﬀs among current (date t) policies, when initial government liabilities are
(Mt−1,(1 + it−1)Bt−1). Imposing equilibrium on the government budget constraint
for dates s>t ,and assuming future policy is anticipated (so 1+i = µ/β),
f(µ)
∙








= g − τ, (17)
where we assume that Bt/Mt = B/M, so the bond-money ratio is constant in the
stationary equilibrium at B/M. For a given state of government indebtedness, B/M,
(17) describes the trade-oﬀs among future policies that are consistent with equilib-
rium. The bond-money ratio, which links current policies to future policies, can
equivalently be thought of in terms of the real value of government debt outstanding
or the debt-output ratio.
3.4. Bond-Financed Tax Cut. In the policy experiments we consider, the level of
government spending is held ﬁxed at g. The experiments take the form of an initial
cut in taxes at t, dτt < 0, which is ﬁnanced by new sales of nominal bonds, and then
they consider alternative responses of current and future policies that satisfy (16)
and (17). The analysis traces the impacts of each complete speciﬁcation of policy
behavior on the price level and inﬂation.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 8
3.4.1. Ricardian equivalence. Hold current and future money growth, (µt,µ), ﬁxed.
By (14) and (15), this policy pegs the nominal interest rate at 1+i = µ/β and
ﬁxes equilibrium real balances at f(µ). Neither the initial price level, Pt,n o rt h e
stationary inﬂation rate, π, change. A reduction in real taxes today is consistent
with equilibrium today if nominal debt expands to satisfy (16) with ﬁxed money
growth. This raises Bt/Mt, w h i c hb y( 1 7 )r e q u i r e st h a tf u t u r et a x e sr i s es u ﬃciently to
service the new, higher level of government indebtedness. This mix of policies implies
Ricardian equivalence: the timing of taxes and debt is irrelevant for equilibrium
allocations and prices. The policies also imply monetary policy is independent of
ﬁscal considerations, as the quantity theory of money maintains. Of course, as this
exercise illustrates, the quantity theory requires a particular kind of ﬁscal behavior.
3.4.2. Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. The central bank holds current money growth,
µt, ﬁxed, while the ﬁscal authority continues to hold future taxes constant. Because
some future policy is free to adjust, it is feasible for current policy to imply more
debt in the future. To service that higher debt, future money growth and inﬂation
must rise, increasing the nominal interest rate and reducing real money balances at
t. Since Mt is ﬁxed, Pt must rise to clear the money market. It is higher inﬂation and
seigniorage revenues–revenues derived from the “inﬂation tax” on nominal assets–
that service future debt. Again, with future net-of-interest ﬁscal deﬁcits held ﬁxed
at g − τ, monetary policy is constrained by ﬁscal needs and, in this case, the central
bank loses control of future inﬂation.5
3.4.3. The ﬁscal theory. The central bank credibly pegs the nominal interest rate by
ﬁxing future money growth, µ, and the ﬁscal authority credibly ﬁxes future taxes, τ.
Can this be an equilibrium? With future policies ﬁxed, (17) implies current policies
cannot alter government indebtedness in the future, summarized by B/M, so the
expansion in nominal debt cannot be transformed into higher real debt. Pt must rise
in proportion to Bt. But a pegged nominal interest rate ﬁxes real money balances,
according to (14) and (15), so the current money stock must expand in proportion
to the increase in prices, ensuring no change in Bt/Mt in (16). The central bank
loses control of the current money stock and the price level, as adjustments in these
variables are governed by ﬁscal needs that are beyond the bank’s direct control. A
pegged nominal rate subordinates current monetary policy to ﬁscal needs, but this is
not “monetization of deﬁcits” in the usual sense of printing money to purchase newly
issued government debt. Instead, the expansion in money is a passive adjustment of
the money supply to clear the money market at the prevailing interest rate and price
5Sargent and Wallace (1981) employ these assumptions about policy in their classic “Unpleasant
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level. The monetary expansion is given by dMt = dBt/(Bt/Mt), making clear that
the monetary accommodation varies inversely with the level of indebtedness.6
These exercises demonstrate that how a tax cut ﬁnanced by nominal bond sales
impacts inﬂation and the price level depends on assumptions about how current and
future monetary and ﬁscal policies respond to the tax cut to be consistent with
equilibrium.
4. Background on Monetary and Fiscal Interactions
The model in the previous section lays out the logic of how current and future macro
policies interact to determine the equilibrium. Stationary analysis, however, can make
it diﬃcult to link the results to observed time series. It can also be informative to
characterize policy behavior in terms of simple rules, rather than sequences of policy
variables. For example, it is now popular to describe a central bank’s policy of
“leaning against the wind” as raising the policy interest rate instrument whenever
the inﬂation rate exceeds the bank’s target level [Taylor (1993)]. We turn now to
an analysis using parametric families of policy rules that have received attention in
previous research.














where π∗ and b∗ are target inﬂation and debt levels, bt−1 = Bt−1/Pt−1 is real debt
at the end of period t − 1, which is carried into period t, and θ and ψ are mutually
uncorrelated random variables with unit mean, possibly serially correlated, describ-
ing exogenous changes in monetary and tax policies. With this modiﬁcation, the
expectations operator Et is now taken with respect to Ωt = {θt−j,ψ t−j,j≥ 0}. Ran-
dom policies shift the focus of ﬁscal ﬁnance away from average and toward marginal
sources of revenues.
6This exercise corresponds to the ﬁscal theory of the price level as described by Leeper (1991),
Sims (1994), and Woodford (1995). As Cochrane (2001) observes, the precise result discussed relies
on government debt being sold at par. If it sold at a discount instead, the price of bonds may absorb
some of the adjustment to equilibrium, oﬀsetting some of the price level impacts.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 10
4.2. Equilibrium. Randomness coupled with policy rules makes the model ana-
lytically intractable, so analysis focuses on local dynamics in the neighborhood of
the steady state when the policy shocks are identically zero and inﬂation and debt
are at their target levels. Deﬁne the percentage deviation from steady state as
ˆ xt ≡ lnxt −ln ¯ x, where ¯ x denotes steady state value. The model reduces to a system
of two linear stochastic diﬀerence equations in inﬂation and real debt:7
Etˆ πt+1 = αˆ πt + ˆ θt (20)
and
ˆ bt + λ1ˆ πt − [β
−1 − γ(β
−1 − 1)]ˆ bt−1 + λ2ˆ πt−1 +[ β
−1 − 1]ˆ ψt + λ3ˆ θt + λ4ˆ θt−1 =0 , (21)
where
λ1 = ¯ m
¯ b (αϕ +1 )+β














ϕ is the negative interest elasticity of money demand and ¯ m/¯ b is the steady state
money-debt ratio.8 Expression (21) is simpliﬁed by focusing on a steady state with
no government spending (¯ g =0 )and a constant price level (¯ π =1 ) . The eigenvalues
of (20) and (21) are α and β
−1 − γ(β
−1 − 1), and a unique saddle-path equilibrium
requires (the modulus of) the two roots to lie on either side of 1 [Blanchard and Kahn
(1980)]. We focus on two economically meaningful regions of the policy parameter
space for which unique equilibria exist:
Region I: α>1 and γ>1
Region II: α<1 and γ<1.
(23)
Policy impacts on inﬂation are qualitatively diﬀerent across the two regions.
Policy behavior in the two regions is “active” or “passive,” referring to the con-
straints a policy authority faces. An active authority pays no attention to the state of
government debt and is free to set its control variable as it sees ﬁt. Monetary policy is
active in Region I and ﬁscal policy is active in Region II. A passive authority responds
to government debt in a manner constrained by the equilibrium, which depends on
7Leeper (1991) contains a more complete derivation.
8To obtain (21), use the log-linear approximations of money demand ˆ mt = −(1/χ)(β/(1 − β))ˆ ıt,
where 1/χ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of real balances, and of the policy rules to
obtain expressions forˆ ıt and ˆ τt. Use those expressions in the linearized government budget constraint.
We have also made the simplifying assumption that the steady state tax revenue to debt ratio, τ/b,
equals β
−1 − 1, which for typical values of β is not an unreasonable assumption.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 11
Region MP FP Result
I |α| > 1 & |γ| > 1= ⇒ unique equilibrium
II |α| < 1 & |γ| < 1= ⇒ unique equilibrium
III |α| < 1 & |γ| > 1= ⇒ multiple equilibria
IV |α| > 1 & |γ| < 1= ⇒ no equilibrium
Table 1. Regions of the policy parameter space (α,γ).
private behavior and the active authority’s actions. Fiscal policy is passive in Region
I and monetary policy is passive in Region II.
For completeness, there are two additional regions to consider. Region III, in which
both policies are passive and the eigenvalues are less than 1, implies the equilibrium
is indeterminate, allowing for the possibility of self-fulﬁlling sunspot equilibria. In
Region IV, where both policies are active and the eigenvalues exceed 1, neither policy
authority is ensuring the government budget constraint is satisﬁed at every date. In
this case, either no equilibrium exists, because the transversality condition for debt
is violated, or no stationary equilibrium exists, because the debt-output ratio grows
without bound (though the growth rate is less than 1/β). The policy parameter space
is summarized in table 1.
4.3. Bond-Financed Tax Cut. An exogenous reduction in taxes is a negative re-
alization of the shock to the tax rule, ψt. Policies considered in section 3.4 are repro-
duced under alternative settings of the two crucial policy parameters, (α,γ).
4.3.1. Ricardian equivalence. In Region I, monetary policy is active and responds to
an increase in inﬂation by raising the nominal interest rate by enough to increase the
real interest rate. Fiscal policy reacts passively to increases in government debt by
raising future taxes suﬃciently to service the new debt. Under these policies, tax
disturbances do not inﬂuence equilibrium prices, interest rates, or real balances.
Equilibrium inﬂation is given by











and the sequence for equilibrium real debt, {ˆ bt}, evolves according to the stable diﬀer-
ence equation (20). Evidently, inﬂation–and money growth–is entirely a monetaryPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 12
phenomenon in the sense that it is independent of shocks to tax policy. Debt and
taxes, on the other hand, respond to both monetary and tax disturbances. This result
corresponds to Ricardian equivalence, the policy in section 3.4.1. This conventional
monetarist outcome requires passive ﬁscal behavior.
4.3.2. The ﬁscal theory I. Fiscal policy is active in Region II and sets taxes indepen-
dently of the state of government indebtedness. The central bank behaves passively,
adjusting money growth and thereby controlling the nominal interest rate, to prevent
government debt from following an unsustainable path. Constrained by ﬁscal ﬁnanc-
ing needs, the central bank can no longer achieve any price level it desires and tax
disturbances can be inﬂationary.
To reproduce the policy in section 3.4.3, consider the special case of a pegged
nominal interest rate (α =0 )and exogenous taxes (γ =0 ) . Also assume the policy
shocks are serially uncorrelated. Gordon and Leeper (forthcoming) call this mix of
exogenous taxes and a pegged nominal interest rate “the canonical ﬁscal theory of
the price level exercise.” Equilibrium inﬂation is











−1 [β(1 − ϕ)+ϕ]ˆ θt + ˆ θt−1. (25)
Note that the steady state level of government debt inﬂuences the responses of in-
ﬂa t i o nt ob o t hm o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal policy changes. A tax cut (negative realization
of ψ) raises inﬂation, with the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to taxes rising with
the level of government debt. If monetary policy raises the nominal rate (positive
realization of θ), current inﬂation may rise or fall, depending on the interest elasticity
of money demand. For elasticities ranging from inelastic to modest, current inﬂation
falls, matching conventional notions that a higher nominal rate is “tighter” policy.
But the Fisher relation kicks in, so the same increase in it raises the expected inﬂation
rate one-for-one.
As in section 3.4.3, ﬁscal disturbances are not permitted to change the real value
of government debt. In equilibrium, real debt is
ˆ bt = β
m
b
(1 − ϕ)ˆ θt, (26)
so i.i.d. tax changes leave debt unchanged, while open-market sales raise the level
of debt. The higher debt carried into the future is serviced–and retired–by higher
seigniorage revenues, raising future inﬂation.
In the equilibrium just presented, on average seigniorage revenues are zero because
the steady state is one with a constant price level. On the margin, though, seignior-
age is very important: without the appropriate (passive) adjustment in the moneyPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 13
stock, there can be no equilibrium–government debt would follow an unsustainable
explosive path and become worthless. Standard methods to evaluate if seigniorage is
an “important” source of revenues, such as computing the time-average of seignior-
age revenues as a share of GDP [King (1995)], may have nothing to say about its
importance on the margin. There is reason to believe this point may be important
in practice. Setting α =0implies the central bank does not adjust its interest rate
instrument in the face of ﬁscal disturbances. Because exogenous changes in taxes,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n dt or e a l i z a t i o n si fψ, are notoriously diﬃcult to identify in data, it
is also diﬃcult to trace whether this kind of accommodation of ﬁscal policy occurs.
4.3.3. The ﬁscal theory II. For a variant of the canonical ﬁscal theory, suppose the
central bank, instead of literally pegging the nominal rate, adjusts it less than one-
for-one with inﬂation (0 <α<1), while the ﬁscal authority continues to set taxes
exogenously (γ =0 ) . Now tax cuts raise inﬂation and the nominal rate jointly. Higher
i raises expected inﬂation, which is rationalized by the passive increase in expected
future money growth. Instead of the passive response of money growth occurring
contemporaneously with the tax shock, as it does when α =0 , monetary policy’s
passive adjustment occurs gradually, raising both current and expected money cre-
ation. Although again this is not the usual monetization of deﬁcits, the equilibrium
exhibits the common view that deﬁcits are monetized if and only if deﬁcits predict,
or Granger-cause, money growth [King and Plosser (1985)].
5. T h eF i s c a lT h e o r yw i t hT a xD i s t o r t i o n s
The model structure of sections 3 and 4–an endowment economy with lump-
sum taxes–is useful for isolating the ﬁscal theory mechanism, which works through
the demand for consumption goods. But the stylized structure makes it hard to
connect the ﬁscal theory to the actual tax systems that the public ﬁnance literature
studies. This section takes a step toward that literature by endogenizing output and
considering a proportional income tax, introducing supply considerations into the
analysis.9
5.1. Household and Government Budget Constraints. We begin by describing
the equilibrium balance sheet of the representative household in a model with com-
plete markets for contingent claims and ﬁat money. Production is constant returns
to scale in labor inputs. We then analyze eﬀects of tax policy on the equilibrium
balance sheet of the household.
9Linnemann (2005) linearizes and examines a related setup. His method of analysis, however,
loses some of the richness developed below.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 14





t[u(ct,m t)+v(1 − ht)], 0 <β<1, (27)
where the new variable, ht, is the number of hours worked at period t and mt = Mt/Pt.
The sequence of household budget constraints is given by
ct + mt + Et[Qt,t+1
Bt,t+1
Pt




for t ≥ 0, with B−1,0+M−1 > 0 given. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used to
compute the nominal value at period t of one dollar at period t+1, wt is the real wage
rate at period t, Φt is real dividends, and τt is the income tax rate. Et[Qt,t+1
Bt,t+1
Pt ]
corresponds to the real value in period t of nominal state contingent claims purchased
by the household, where Bt,t+1 is the number of nominal state contingent bonds paying
one dollar in a given state in period t +1and nothing in other states. The (gross)





Let qt,t+1 denote the stochastic discount factor used to compute the real value at









mt + Et[qt,t+1at+1] ≤ (1 − τt)(wtht + Φt)+at, (31)






Successive forward iteration of the budget constraint leads to the present-value









mt − (1 − τt)(wtht + Φt)
¸
≤ a0, (33)
with limt→∞ E0[qtat]=0 , where qt is the stochastic discount factor used for computing
the real value at period 0 of one unit of consumption goods at period t and q0 =1 .
The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and real money balances are
β








where λ = uc(c0,m 0) is the Lagrange multiplier of the present value budget constraint,
uc(ct,m t) is the marginal utility of consumption, and um(ct,m t) is the marginal utility
of real money balances. The ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply is
v0(1 − ht)
uc(ct,m t)
=( 1− τt)wt. (36)
Next we compute the equilibrium real value of the initial nominal assets of the
representative household. Substitute the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and





t[uc(ct,m t)ct + um(ct,m t)mt − (1 − τt)ytuc(ct,m t)]
uc(c0,m 0)
= a0, (37)
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tqt = β
tuc(ct,m t)/uc(c0,m 0).10 The left-hand side of this
equation is written entirely in terms of allocations. When allocations are uniquely





Because B−1,0 + M−1 > 0 are the pre-determined nominal assets with which the
household begins life, if the equilibrium present value constraint is binding, then when
a set of ﬁscal and monetary policies generate a determinate equilibrium allocation
{ct,y t,m t}∞
t=0, the equilibrium price level in the initial period also has a unique ﬁnite
value.11
Under rational expectations, a0 is the real value of initial nominal assets, which
is known to the household when it solves its optimization problem. This reasoning
implies that the present-value condition in (37) is an equilibrium balance sheet rela-
tion, where the left-hand side of the constraint is the present value of the household’s
l i a b i l i t i e s – d e b ta n dn e tw o r t h – a tp e r i o d0.
An equilibrium condition analogous to (37), but involving policy variables, can be
derived from (37). Substituting the aggregate market clearing condition, yt = ct +gt,
10Expression (37) is closely related to the “implementability condition” that serves as a constraint
in the primal approach to the Ramsey problem of optimal taxation [Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1993)].
11Note that the initial condition on asset is speciﬁed in terms of nominal values. The link to the















Recalling that qt = β
t uc(ct,mt)
uc(c0,m0) and substituting equilibrium real money balances into












The ﬁrst-term in the left-hand side is the expected discounted present value of primary
surpluses and the second term is the expected present value of seigniorage revenue
from money creation. Evidently, although this expression is frequently referred to as
the government’s intertemporal budget “constraint,” it is also an equilibrium condi-
tion. As an equilibrium condition, it plays a role in determining some or all of the
endogenous variables that enter it.12
5.2. A Price-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory. To study the impacts of a
tax change in the general equilibrium model of section 5.1, it is instructive to follow
the public ﬁnance literature to construct a decomposition of the impacts in the spirit
of Slutsky (1915, 1952) and Hicks (1939).
13 To do this in an environment in which the
ﬁscal theory may be operative, we must extend the usual decomposition to include a
third eﬀect induced by the ﬁscal theory mechanism. The ﬁscal theory works through
at y p eo fw e a l t he ﬀect that arises when change in the price level revalues nominal
government assets in households’ portfolios. To the usual substitution and wealth
eﬀects associated with tax changes, we add a “revaluation eﬀect.” The conventional
wealth eﬀect stems from a change in the expected present-value of current and future
labor income ﬂows.
It is convenient to re-express the household’s budget constraint in terms of maxi-
mum income. In period t, maximum income is deﬁned as the sum of dividend income
12Whether (40) should be treated as a constraint facing the government or as an equilibrium
condition of the model lies at the heart of Buiter’s (2002) critique of the ﬁscal theory. He argues that,
in parallel to household behavior, government should be constrained to choose sequences of policy
variables that satisfy (40) for all positive price sequences, {Pt},t ≥ 0. We treat the consolidated
monetary and ﬁscal authorities as choosing sequences of policy variables to be consistent with (40)
and other conditions. For example, the government cannot choose gt >y t, as that would imply
ct < 0, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. But to our knowledge, ct + gt = yt is not referred to
as a government budget constraint.
13King (1991) decomposes the eﬀects of changes in government consumption into substitution
and wealth eﬀects in a linearized neo-classical growth model.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 17
and the maximum labor income households could earn if they worked the full amount
of their (unit) time endowment:
y
F
t =( 1− τt)wt + Φt (41)
where yF
t denotes the maximum income at period t.14 Households take as given their
maximum income when they choose plans for their consumption, real money balances,
and leisure. We think of maximum income as an endowment of income, which the
household takes as given and uses to purchase consumption, real money balances,
and leisure. Maximum income facilitates capturing the eﬀects of tax changes on
the opportunity set of leisure when leisure is a choice variable. The period budget




mt +( 1− τt)wt(1 − ht)+Et[qt,t+1at+1] ≤ y
F
t + at, (42)
for t ≥ 0. Successive forward iteration of (42) leads to the following present-value









mt +( 1− τt)wt(1 − ht)
¸
≤ a0 + v0, (43)
with limt→∞E0[qtat]=0 , limt→∞ E0[qtyF
t ]=0 .v 0 denotes the expected present-value







We restrict analysis to equilibria in which v0 and a0 have positive and ﬁnite values.
A competitive household takes a0 and v0 parametrically.
The ﬁrst-order conditions, (34)-(36), and the budget constraint imply demand func-
tions for consumption and real money balances and a supply function for labor.
Substituting the optimality conditions into the household’s budget constraint, the





where e0 is the expected present-value of expenditures (including leisure) evaluated





t [uc(ct,m t)ct + um(ct,m t)mt + v
0(1 − ht)(1 − ht)]. (46)
14Becker (1965) refers to this as “full income.” To avoid confusion with macroeconomic concepts
like “full employment level of output,” we also call it “maximum income.”POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 18
Because λ i st h es h a d o wp r i c eo fw e a l t h ,( 4 5 )i m p l i e st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nw e a l t h ,
a0 + v0, decreases the shadow price of wealth, while an increase in expenditures, e0,
increases it. Substituting (45) into (34) and (35), we have the following demand







































5.2.1. The revaluation eﬀect of distorting tax policy. There is an important distinction
between the revaluation eﬀect of tax policy and the conventional wealth eﬀect of tax
policy in the public ﬁnance literature.
The key mechanism through which the ﬁscal theory of the price level works is
the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on the price level at period 0.15 In other words, the ﬁscal
theory of the price level asserts that ﬁscal policy can determine a unique value of the
equilibrium price level at period 0, so long as monetary policy is not also determining
the price level.
16 The revaluation eﬀe c to ft a xp o l i c yw o r k st h r o u g hi t se ﬀect on
the real value of the initial nominal assets, denoted by a0. More explicitly, since
households are identical in our economy, it follows from the deﬁnition of a0 that the








Under the ﬁscal theory of price level, tax policy can determine a unique equilibrium
value of P0 by uniquely determining ae
0.
The revaluation eﬀect needs to be distinguished from the conventional wealth eﬀect
that is analyzed in the public ﬁnance literature. Suppose, for example, that initial
nominal assets are zero, i.e., B−1,0+M−1 =0 . Even in this case, when the revaluation
eﬀect on P0 is always zero, we can see from equations (47), (48), and (49) that the
conventional wealth eﬀect of tax policy can aﬀect consumption, real money balances
15The focus on the date 0 price level stems from the presentation’s use of an Arrow-Debreu
structure with complete markets in dated contingent claims all traded at time 0. In a stochastic
model with a sequential-trading structure, the ﬁscal theory determines the price level at each date
t.
16In terms of the language in section 4, the ﬁscal theory of the price level is operative when ﬁscal
policy is active and monetary policy is passive.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 19
and labor supply through its eﬀects on v0 and e0.W h e n B−1,0 + M−1 > 0,t h e
revaluation eﬀect operates independently of the conventional wealth eﬀect.
Of course, changes in taxes can aﬀect the price level even in environments where
the ﬁscal theory is not operative. When monetary policy is active and ﬁscal policy
adjusts passively to ensure the equilibrium conditions (equations (37) and (40), among
others) are always satisﬁed, a change in tax policy can aﬀect the equilibrium price
level solely through its eﬀects on aggregate demand and supply. For example, suppose
that the government raises the income tax rate at period 0, τ0. The substitution eﬀect
of the temporary rise in income tax rate decreases the labor supply and the wealth
eﬀect raises it at the same time. The ﬁnal impact on labor supply and the price level
depends on whether the wealth eﬀect or the substitution eﬀect dominates.
In this environment, the resulting change in the price level generates a revaluation
eﬀect which, through passive tax policy, imposes restrictions on the sequence of ex-
pected future tax rates, {τt}∞
t=1, necessary for equilibrium. In contrast, under the
ﬁscal theory, ﬁscal policy is active and the entire sequence of tax rates, {τt}∞
t=0, is
exogenous. Active ﬁscal behavior, together with passive monetary policy, imply that
P0 (and hence a0) must adjust to ensure that equations (37) and (40), and conditions
for equilibrium are satisﬁed.
5.2.2. Deriving substitution, wealth, and revaluation eﬀects. We deﬁne substitution,
wealth, and revaluation eﬀects generally, without any speciﬁca s s u m p t i o n sa b o u tﬁscal
or monetary policy behavior. Suppose that the labor income tax rate process changes





t=0. The optimization problem of the






















≤ a0 + v0. (52)
On the other hand, the optimization problem of the household under tax policy regime






















≤ a0 + v0. (54)POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 20













t=0. The sequence of equilibrium





















t=0 corresponds to the tax
regime ‘†’.
To compute the substitution eﬀect of the change in tax policy, we use a lump-sum
transfer at period t, denoted by Ts
0, through which the household can achieve the
same utility level that the household would have obtained under the tax policy ‘∗’,
even though it optimizes under the price system of the tax policy ‘†’. Speciﬁcally,





































Prices in the budget constraint, (56), are constrained to be equilibrium prices under
tax policy regime ‘†’. This ensures that the budget line of this problem is tangent
to the household’s indiﬀerence surface under tax regime ‘†’. In addition, the lump-
sum transfer Ts
0 guarantees that the utility level that the household obtains from the
optimization problem (51)-(52) is the same as the one that comes from (55)-(56).
Hence, our decomposition is consistent with a Hicksian decomposition of the tax
policy change.
Recall that a competitive household takes a0 and v0 parametrically. To capture
the revaluation eﬀect, confront the household with two counterfactual optimization
problems. First, if households assume that revaluation of assets does not result from
the tax change, so that their assets have value a0 = a∗
0 under the tax regime ‘†’, their



































Next, we introduce a lump-sum transfer, denoted by Tw
0 , to adjust the level of util-






































The lump-sum transfer Tw
0 permits the optimization problems (59)-(60) and (57)-(58)
to achieve the same level of utility.17
The total eﬀect corresponds to the change in the consumer’s decision between the
two optimization problems (51)-(52) and (53)-(54). The substitution eﬀect is the
change in the consumer’s decision between the two optimization problems (51)-(52)
and (55)-(56). The revaluation eﬀect is associated with the change in the consumer’s
decision between the two optimization problems (57)-(58) and (59)-(60). We com-
pute the conventional wealth eﬀect by subtracting the sum of the substitution and
revaluation eﬀects from the total eﬀect.
The total eﬀect of a tax change on consumption can be expressed in terms of
substitution, wealth, and revaluation eﬀects using the consumption demand functions
derived from the optimization problems above. Denote the consumption demand













































































0 is the level of planned consumption under tax policy †,b u th o l d i n g
the level of lifetime utility ﬁxed at u∗
0, where u∗
0 is the level of lifetime utility under







































0 is the level of planned consumption without revaluation of assets





17Note that whereas the transfer Ts
0 is in real income, the transfer Tw
0 is in nominal assets, so T w
0
is the real value of asset transfers.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 22
the level of lifetime utility under tax policy ‘†’. We now deﬁne the total eﬀect of a tax
change on planned consumption as the logarithmic diﬀerence between the planned
consumption levels under the two tax regimes. This total eﬀect can be decomposed


































total substitution wealth revaluation
eﬀect eﬀect eﬀect eﬀect
(64)
This decomposition oﬀers a new approach to isolating the ﬁscal theory mechanism
that is fully compatible with conventional price theory.18
5.3. An Example Economy. We present an analytical solution to a simple dynamic
general equilibrium model as an example of our extended Slutsky-Hicks decomposi-
tion. We restrict preferences to be logarithmic over consumption, real money bal-
ances, and labor supply with additive separability, and technology to be linear. Then
the value functions are additively separable between wealth terms and price terms.
Appendix A demonstrates that when the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution de-
viates from one, value functions are no longer additively separable between wealth
and prices.
5.3.1. Deriving the value function. In our example, the preferences of households are
represented by the utility function:
u(ct,m t)+v(1 − ht)=l o gct +l o gmt +l o g ( 1− ht). (65)





Substituting (65) into optimization conditions (34), (35), and (36), we can express
consumption, real money balances, and labor supply in terms of prices and wealth as
shown in (47), (48), and (49). More explicitly, the consumption demand function at










(a0 + v0). (67)
18There is no unique way to deﬁne the decomposition. We use the price system of tax regime ‘†’
to evaluate the consumption change due to the revaluation eﬀect. Alternatively, one may use the
price system of tax regime ‘∗’ to evaluate the consumption change due to the revaluation eﬀect.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 23
Consumption demand has elasticities of unity with respect to wealth and -1 with













(a0 + v0), (68)










(a0 + v0). (69)
Substituting (67)-(69) into (65) for each t ≥ 0 and summing from period 0 onward,
the expected discounted sum of instantaneous utilities evaluated at the consumer’s















where u0 denotes the optimized level of the household’s lifetime utility at period 0
and γt is deﬁned as
γt =3 ( tlogβ − logqt)+l o g
1+it
it
− [log(1 − τt)+l o gwt]. (71)
5.3.2. Computing substitution, wealth, and revaluation eﬀects. To compute substitu-
tion, wealth, and revaluation eﬀects, we assume that households face an exogenous
regime change in income tax policy from ‘∗’t o‘ †’, as we did in the previous sec-
tion. Given logarithmic, additively separable preferences for consumption, the ratio
























We now compute the revaluation eﬀect of tax change. First, we compute the size
of lump-sum tax Ts
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Since the lump-sum transfer Ts




0, it follows from (73)


























In addition, the optimization problem (55)-(56) yields a compensated consumption



































































































Since the lump-sum transfer Tw








0, we can use equations
























































Consequently, we can ﬁnd that if revaluation of initial nominal assets results from a
change in tax policy, it can have impact on planned consumption demands through
the asset component of wealth.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 25
5.4. Revaluation Eﬀect: Active Fiscal and Passive Monetary Policies. For
the ﬁscal theory mechanism to be operative, with ﬁscal policy determining the price
level, it must be the case that monetary policy is passive in the sense that the central
bank ensures that an equilibrium exists when tax policy is active. One simple example
of passive monetary policy is a nominal interest rate peg. Treating the sequence of
tax rates as exogenous makes ﬁscal policy active. This section solves for the general
equilibrium when tax policy changes from one exogenous sequence of tax rates to
another, while monetary policy stands ready to buy and sell reserves in whatever
quantity is necessary to hold the nominal interest rate ﬁxed.
Suppose that the central bank maintains a constant nominal interest rate
β(1 + it)=1 , (83)
for t ≥ 0.
5.4.1. The case of lump-sum taxes. Before tackling the more complicated case of
distorting taxes, it is instructive to construct a Slutsky-Hicks decomposition for the
simpler case of lump-sum taxes. To do this, we set τt =0for all t and modify full
income by subtracting the lump-sum tax, zt :
y
F
t = wt + Φt − zt, (84)




mt + wt(1 − ht)+Et [qt,t+1at+1] ≤ y
F
t + at. (85)
With logarithmic preferences over c,m, and 1 − h, and a linear production tech-





qt(wt − zt)]. (86)




Setting ct =( 1− sg)yt to clear the goods market and ht = yt yields
yt =
1
2 − sg. (88)
It is clear from (88) that the equilibrium level of output does not depend on the level
of lump-sum tax. It also implies that since the share of government expenditures isPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 26
constant over time, the price at period 0 of one unit of consumption goods at period
t is given by
qt = β
t. (89)
Given the special functional forms of the utility function, the sum of real value of
nominal assets at the beginning of period 0 and the expected present-value at period
0 of maximum income ﬂows is independent of the level of lump-sum tax. Recall that





and the expected-present value of expenditures ﬂows evaluated at the consumer’s





Substituting (88) and (91) into (90), we have
a0 + v0 =
3(1 − sg)
(1 − β)(2 − sg)
, (92)
making it clear that in equilibrium allocations will be independent of the lump-sum






Subtracting (93) from (92), we can see that the real value of nominal assets at the






2 − sg + z
¸
. (94)
The two components of wealth, v0 and a0, are aﬀected in exactly oﬀsetting ways by
lump-sum taxes.
Of course, with lump-sum taxes the (log) substitution eﬀect is zero. To compute
the wealth eﬀect in the conventional decomposition and revaluation eﬀect in our
approach, suppose that the government permanently changes lump-sum taxes from











(2 − sg)(z∗ − z†)
3(1 − sg)
, (95)













(2 − sg)(z∗ − z†)
3(1 − sg)
¸−1
. (96)POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 27
Although higher taxes have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the two components of wealth, for
z† >z ∗, the eﬀect through full income is unambiguously negative, while the eﬀect
through revaluation of assets is unambiguously positive.







1 − 2sg + z∗(2 − sg)
1 − 2sg + z†(2 − sg)
. (97)
Figure 1 shows the three eﬀects for changes in the level of lump-sum taxes. Per-
manently higher taxes, z† >z ∗, reduce full income and its present value, v0. With
consumption and leisure normal goods, this lower wealth reduces planned consump-
tion, as the top left panel of the ﬁgure shows. At the same time, higher taxes raise the
expected discounted present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage, driving down
the initial price level and generating a positive revaluation eﬀect, as shown in the right
panels of the ﬁgure. Analysis that overlooks the revaluation eﬀect would mistakenly
infer that a tax hike lowers output through the conventional wealth eﬀect. But this
result cannot be an equilibrium. Accounting for the revaluation eﬀect shows that, in
equilibrium, a change in lump-sum taxes is neutral with respect to output. Higher
taxes nonetheless have price level eﬀects that, in an environment with heterogeneous
households, would have distributional consequences.
5.4.2. Equilibrium prices and quantities. Returning to the case of income taxes, we
now compute equilibrium prices and allocations. Again we assume that perfectly
competitive ﬁrms produce their products using a linear technology, yt = ht.I n
addition, wages and prices are fully ﬂexible. Given the linear technology, the real
wage is wt =1in each period t ≥ 0. The share of government expenditures in output
is constant, gt/yt = sg for t ≥ 0. The equilibrium level of output is
yt =
1 − τt
2 − sg − τt
(98)
and the real price at period 0 of one unit of consumption goods at period t is
qt = β
t(1 − τ0)(2 − sg − τt)
(1 − τt)(2 − sg − τ0)
. (99)







(1 − τ0)(2 − sg − τt)
2 − sg − τ0
¸
, (100)
and the present-value budget constraint can be written as
a0 + v0 =
3
1 − β
(1 − τ0)(1 − sg)
2 − τ0 − sg . (101)POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 28
From (98) it is apparent that direct tax revenues, τtyt, are quadratic in τ, imply-
ing the existence of a Laﬀer curve. Revenues reach a maximum at ¯ τ =2− sg − p
(2 − sg)(1 − sg).
5.4.3. Revaluation eﬀect of permanent tax changes. The ﬁscal authority maintains a
constant income tax rate. It follows from (98) that the equilibrium level of consump-
tion, ct =( 1−sg)yt, is constant. Now we show that with monetary policy pegging the
nominal interest rate according to (83), tax policy can determine a unique equilibrium
price level given an initial level of nominal assets. The real price at period 0 of one
unit of consumption goods at period t turns out to be qt = β
t. Substituting this into









1 − 2sg + τ
2 − sg − τ
. (103)




2 − sg − τ
1 − 2sg + τ
(B−1 + M−1). (104)
Suﬃcient conditions for a positive price-level are




,B −1 + M−1 > 0. (105)
The quadratic expression in τ in (103) makes it clear that there will also be a type
of Laﬀer curve in the sum of the expected present values of primary surpluses and
seigniorage. The presence of two distinct Laﬀer curves is critical to understanding
how tax rate changes aﬀect this economy.
We turn now to an extended Slutsky-Hicks decomposition for this example economy.







































(1 − τ†)(2 − τ∗ − sg)
(1 − τ∗)(2 − τ† − sg)
. (107)
Recall that equations (77), (81), and (82) show how to compute substitution, wealth,
and revaluation eﬀects under logarithmic utility. Equation (77) implies that thePOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 29
substitution eﬀect of permanent tax policy under nominal interest rate targeting is
y†|u0=u∗
0









As expected, the substitution eﬀect of moving to a permanently higher tax rate,
τ† >τ ∗, is unambiguously negative: planned hours worked, output, and consumption
all fall.



































(1 − τ∗)(1 − 2sg + τ∗)+( 1− τ†)(2 − τ∗ − sg)
3(1 − τ∗)(1 − sg)
. (110)




























3(1 − τ†)(1 − sg)(2 − sg − τ∗)
(2 − τ† − sg)(3(1 − τ∗)(1 − sg) − (τ† − τ∗)(2 − sg − τ∗))
. (112)
Evidently, substitution and wealth eﬀects do not generally oﬀset each other, as
one ﬁnds with additively separable logarithmic preferences in a static setting [Salanie
(2003)]. A special case in which the two eﬀects do cancel arises under a balanced
budget, where τ = sg.19
Figures 2-4 plot the various eﬀects of a permanent change in tax rate over three
ranges of rates. At low tax rates it appears that the revaluation eﬀect on the level
of output rises monotonically with the tax rate, while the revaluation eﬀect on the
initial price level falls monotonically [ﬁgure 2]. This result is consistent with the case
of lump-sum taxes. Figures 3 and 4, however, undermine this consistency. At medium
tax rates the revaluation eﬀect on output and the price level is non-monotonic [ﬁgure
3], while at high tax rates the monotonicity reappears, but the sign of the eﬀect has
changed from the lump-sum tax case [ﬁgure 4].
Figure 5 reveals the source of the non-monotonicity. The model generates two
distinct Laﬀer curves. A conventional Laﬀer curve ﬁnds that the direct tax revenue
19Decision rules for labor diﬀe ri nt h es t a t i ca n dd y n a m i cm o d e l s . C o n s i d e rt h es t a t i cp r o b l e m
max(c,h) log(c)+l o g ( 1− h) subject to c ≤ (1 − τ)wh, where households take τ and w as given.
The solution is a decision rule that makes labor constant, h =1 /2, and independent of policy. The
analogous problem in the dynamic model in the text yields the decision rule h =( 1−sg−τ)/(1−sg),
which clearly depends on both government spending and the tax rate.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 30
ﬂow (τtyt) is maximized at a relatively high tax rate of 58.6 percent. In contrast, the
present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage–the object that determines the
revaluation eﬀect and the price level under the ﬁscal theory–is maximized at a much
lower rate of 26.8 percent. At tax rates below 26.8 percent, higher rates raise this
present value. This lowers the price level, raises the value of initial nominal assets, and
induces a positive revaluation eﬀect on output. At rates above 26.8 percent, higher
rates reduce the present value of surpluses plus seigniorage and the process is reversed.
The reversal arises from the disincentive eﬀects created by higher rates of labor income
taxation, which reduce output, equilibrium real balances–the seigniorage tax base–
and, when monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate, seigniorage revenues. This
phenomenon underscores the importance of modeling tax distortions, even when the
primary interest is the ﬁscal theory of the price level.
Although the details appearing in ﬁgure 5 are speciﬁc to the example economy, the
principle that when the ﬁscal theory is operative the economy exhibits two distinct
Laﬀer curves is general. Precisely what the two curves look like depends on model
speciﬁcation and parameter assumptions.
5.5. Contrasting Active and Passive Monetary and Fiscal Policies. Am o r e
complete understanding of how monetary and ﬁscal policies interact to determine
the equilibrium can be achieved by contrasting active and passive policy behavior.
To illustrate the revaluation eﬀect produced by the ﬁscal theory, section 5.4 assumes
active ﬁscal policy in the form of an exogenous sequence of tax rates, {τt}∞
t=0, and
passive monetary policy in the form of a pegged nominal interest rate satisfying
1+it =1 /β, making money supply endogenous. We now consider an alternative
policy assumption that monetary policy is active, setting an exogenous sequence of
money stocks, {Mt}∞
t=0, while ﬁscal policy passively adjusts tax rates endogenously
to be consistent with equilibrium.
For simplicity, assume that both the tax rate and the money stock are constants:
τt = τ and Mt = M, all t ≥ 0. It follows from (98) that consumption and output
are constant over time. The constant money supply ﬁxes the price level from period
0 onward. The Euler equation therefore implies that the nominal interest rate is
it =( 1− β)/β in each period t ≥ 0. Consequently, the demand for real money





Using (98) for y0 in the money demand equation (113), we have
P0 =
(1 − β)(2 − sg − τ)
(1 − sg)(1 − τ)
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Based on the assumption that the income tax rate is independent of the money supply,
one might be tempted to conclude from (114) that, as predicted by simple quantity
theories of money, the price level is proportional to the money supply. But it turns
out that the equilibrium price level may not be proportional to the money supply,
even when the money supply is exogenously speciﬁed. Substituting (104) into (114),
the relationship between the money stock and income tax rate is:
M0 =
1 − sg
1 − 2sg + τ
(B−1 + M−1). (115)
Equation (115) makes clear that there is one-to-one correspondence between the
money stock and income tax rate in equilibrium, given the initial level of nominal
assets and the share of government expenditures. Equation (115) can be rewritten as
τ =
(1 − sg)(B−1 + M−1)
M0
− (1 − 2s
g). (116)
Substituting (116) into (114), we can see that the relationship between the price level




3M0 − (B−1 + M−1)
2M0 − (B−1 + M−1)
M0. (117)
A set of suﬃcient conditions for a positive price level is
0 <β<1, 0 <s
g < 1, 2M0 >B −1 + M−1. (118)
The non-linearity of the relationship between the money supply and price level that
appears in (117) derives from the presence of a distorting income tax. In contrast,
when only lump-sum taxes exist, the price level is proportional to the money supply.
To see this, recall that with lump-sum taxes, equilibrium output is:
y0 =
1
1 − 2sg. (119)
Substituting (119) into the money demand equation, (113), the relationship between
the price level and money supply is given by
P0 =
(1 − β)(1 − 2sg)
1 − sg M0, (120)
indicating that with lump-sum taxes, the equilibrium price level is proportional to
the money supply. This holds true even though there is one-to-one correspondence
between the money supply and the lump-sum tax.
We now turn to the discussion of active and passive monetary policies based on the
relationship between the income tax and money stock described above. An example
of active monetary policy regime is the case where the central bank chooses a level
of the money stock at period 0 and maintains it from period 0 onward, regardless ofPOLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 32
the income tax rate and the share of government expenditures. Speciﬁcally, a regime
of active monetary and passive ﬁscal policies is that the income tax rate, denoted by
τ, is endogenously chosen to satisfy equation (115), once a level of M0 is exogenously
set by the central bank. An example of passive monetary and active ﬁscal policies, in
contrast, is the case where the money stock M0 is endogenously determined to satisfy
equation (115), given that the ﬁscal authority chooses an income tax rate exogenously.
An immediate consequence of the distinction between active and passive monetary
policy regimes is that revaluation of nominal assets can take place even when monetary
policy is active.20 Under the regime of active monetary and passive ﬁscal policies,
with constant tax rates revaluation eﬀects can arise from changes in the price level
induced by exogenous changes in money supply.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has emphasized that changes in tax policies can have eﬀects on the
macro economy by changing the equilibrium price level and, therefore, the value of
nominal government assets held by private agents. This mechanism, which we dubbed
“the revaluation eﬀect,” is always present, whether the price level is determined by
the ﬁscal theory or by some other, more conventional route. The paper derived the
revaluation eﬀect as a natural extension of the standard Slutsky-Hicks decomposition,
grounding the idea in conventional price theory. When the ﬁscal theory of the price
level is operative, the revaluation eﬀect is the ﬁrst step in the transmission mechanism
for ﬁscal policy.
To date, virtually all expositions of the ﬁscal theory have employed the convenient
artiﬁce of lump-sum taxes. Assuming that taxes do not distort leads to an unam-
biguous prediction of the ﬁscal theory: higher taxes increase the value of nominal
government liabilities and lower the price level. This result is appealing because it
accords with traditional Keynesian notions that tax hikes reduce aggregate demand.
This paper has shown, by way of example, that the Keynesian result is not general, as
it relies on there being little or no supply-side eﬀect from tax changes. In the presence
of distorting taxes, when the ﬁscal theory is operative there are two distinct Laﬀer
curves associated with labor income tax rates. The ﬁrst is the usual one arising from
the disincentive eﬀects of high tax rates; this is the eﬀe c tt h a tL a ﬀer (1979) himself
emphasized. The second, which is unique to the ﬁscal theory, involves the expected
discounted present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage. When tax hikes al-
w a y sr a i s et h i sp r e s e n tv a l u e – a st h e ya l w a y sd ow h e nt a x e sd on o td i s t o r t – t h eu s u a l
20Note that the revaluation eﬀect does not arise under a certain set of active monetary policies.
For example, the revaluation eﬀect does not take place when the central bank successfully targets a
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ﬁscal theory result obtains and the price level falls. But if tax rates are high enough
to be on the “wrong” side of this second Laﬀer curve, higher taxes might reduce
the present value and raise the price level. Importantly, there is no tight connection
between the positions of the two Laﬀer curves.
Relating the theoretical insights of this paper to actual data remains an open area
of research.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 34
Appendix A. More General Preferences
In this appendix, we analyze the case where the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution is constant but not equal to 1. We maintain additive separability between
consumption and leisure. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the utility function is given by











(1 − ht)1−σ − 1
1 − σ
, (1)
where κ1, κ2,a n dκ3 are positive. It then follows from (46) that the expected present-
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where θ = −1−σ
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Hence, we can use this equation to show that the relationship between the expected
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On the other hand, recall that the lump-sum transfer Ts
0 is a device to guarantee the
same value to value functions that are derived from optimization problems under two



















































θ − 1), (7)












Solving this equation for z then yields a value of Ts
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Figure 1. The eﬀects of changes in lump-sum taxes with elastic labor
supply and ﬂexible prices.POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 39




















































































Figure 2. The eﬀects of permanent changes in income tax rates, τ ∈ [0,.25].POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 40
























































































Figure 3. The eﬀects of permanent changes in income tax rates, τ ∈ [0,.5].POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 41



















































































Figure 4. The eﬀects of permanent changes in income tax rates, τ ∈ [.2,.8].POLICY INTERACTIONS AND THE PRICE LEVEL 42




























primary surplus + seigniorage
(present value)
τ = 26.8% τ = 58.6%
Figure 5. Eﬀects of income tax rate on tax base, tax revenue ﬂows,
and the present value of primary surpluses plus seigniorage. Vertical
lines labeled with tax rates denote maxima.